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THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION ACT
The number of personal bankruptcies has nearly doubled in the past
ten years: it rose from roughly 700,000 in 1990 to more than 1.2 million
in 2000, passing through a peak of nearly 1.4 million in 1998.1 Despite
the prosperity of the 1990s, roughly one percent of American households
declared bankruptcy each year.2 In response to these figures, and to ag-
gressive lobbying by banks and consumer lenders, 3 broad bipartisan ma-
jorities in both the House and Senate passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act ("Bankruptcy Reform Act") early
in the 107th Congress. 4 President Bush has indicated he will sign the
bill,5 which is virtually identical to legislation that President Clinton killed
by pocket-veto in the 106th Congress.
6
Proponents describe the Bankruptcy Reform Act as an effort to re-
store an ethic of personal responsibility among borrowers by forcing
them to repay what debts they can.7 At a time of impending recession,
they argue, the bill will deter reckless borrowing, generating savings for
lenders that will be passed on to consumers in the form of lower interest
rates.8 As prominent academics, congressional Democrats, and consumer
' See American Bankruptcy Institute, U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2000 (Business,
Non-Business, Total), available at http:lwww.abiworld.orglstats/l1980annual.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2001).
2See Michelle J. White, Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205 (1998).3See 145 CONG. REc. S 14,067 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feingold
(D-Wis.) (indicating that "[a] very wealthy and powerful industry has pushed and pushed
and pushed for this bill:' and that "the members of the National Consumer Bankruptcy
Coalition, an industry lobbying group made up of the major credit card companies such as
Visa and MasterCard and associations representing the Nation's big banks and retailers,
gave nearly $4.5 million in contributions to parties and candidates" during the 1998 elec-
tion cycle); see also Kathleen Day, House Passes Bankruptcy Limits: Measure Would Make
it Harder for Consumers to Wipe Out All Debts, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2001, at Al ("Con-
tributions to federal candidates and the political parties from finance and credit card com-
panies during the 2000 campaign totaled $9.2 million .... Commercial banks' political
contributions [totaled] $28.5 million.").
4 H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001). The House Bill passed on
March 1, 2001 by a margin of 306 to 108, receiving 93 Democratic votes in favor and no
Republican "nay" votes. See CONG. REc. H600-01 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2001). The Senate
then passed the bill with minor amendments on July 17, 2001 by a margin of eighty-two to
sixteen. See 147 CONG. REc. S7742 (daily ed. July 18, 2001).
5 See Day, supra note 3, at Al.
6 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CON-
SUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2001, H.R. REP. No. 107-3, at 3 (2001) [hereinafter HOUSE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT].
7 See, e.g., id. at 2 ("The purpose of the bill is to improve bankruptcy law and practice
by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system... "'); 147
CONG. REC. H518 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of Rep. Armey (R-Tex.), House
Majority Leader) ("This bill is about the character of a Nation and [whether] the Nation's
laws have a character of the Nation's people.').
8 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S1807 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2001) (statement of Sen. Grassley
(R-Iowa)) ("With the possibility of the economy slowing right now, we need to at this time
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advocates have noted, however, the bill carries a strong pro-creditor bias
that threatens to undermine its purported objectives. 9 Since the bill does
little to curb the lending practices that have made possible Americans'
extraordinary debts, there is reason to believe it will succeed neither in
reducing bankruptcies nor lowering interest rates.' 0
The main thrust of the reform bill is to provide less generous options
to debtors who file for bankruptcy. Under current law, debtors may
choose between two personal bankruptcy options: asset liquidation under
Chapter Seven" of the bankruptcy portion of the United States Code, and
debt readjustment under Chapter Thirteen.2 Any debtor may seek the
protection of either chapter, regardless of whether the debtor is insol-
vent. 3 Chapter Seven permits the filer to discharge all debts, with certain
exceptions such as mortgages, student loans, fraudulently incurred debts,
and some child support and alimony obligations.' 4 In return for the dis-
charge, however, the debtor must accept the liquidation of all assets, ex-
cepting certain exempt property such as the debtor's homestead. 5 By
fix a bankruptcy system that inflates interest rates and threatens to make the slowdown
even worse.").
9 See Kathleen Day, Foes of Bankruptcy Bill Point Finger at Credit Card Issuers,
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2001, at El; see also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANK-
RUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2001: DISSENTING
VIEWS, H.R. REP. No. 107-3, at 455 (2001) [hereinafter JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENT-
ING VIEWS] ("We oppose the bill because it is likely to harm low income consumers,
women and children reliant on alimony and child support, and employees of troubled busi-
nesses, among other vulnerable groups."); 147 CONG. REC. H518 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001)
(statement of Rep. Conyers (D-Mich.), Ranking Member, House Judiciary Comm.) (calling
House Bill 333 "a bill that massively tilts the playing field in favor of creditors and against
the interests of ordinary consumers and workers.").
10 See, e.g., JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS, supra note 9, at 478 (criticiz-
ing the Bankruptcy Reform Act for "ignor[ing] the transgressions of the credit industry,"
and noting that "the overwhelming weight of authority establishes that it is the massive
increase in consumer debt ... which has brought about the increases in consumer
filings."); infra text accompanying notes 57-88.
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
12 d. §§ 1301-1330.
B- See id. § 707(b) (stating that a court may deny access to Chapter Seven only if it
finds that "the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this
chapter."). Commentators have disputed the extent to which this provision protects credi-
tors from bankruptcies by debtors who could afford to pay their debts. Compare SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1999, S. REP. No. 106-49, at 6
(1999) (indicating that, since the statute provided no definition of "substantial abuse,"
courts have generally held excess income is only one factor to be considered) with Carl
Felsenfeld, Denial of Discharge for Substantial Abuse: Refining-Not Changing-Bank-
ruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1369 (1999) (noting a split in Circuits between two tests
for "substantial abuse," the "excess income" test and the "totality of the circumstances"
test, but arguing that in practice "courts routinely apply only an excess income test"). A
finding of "substantial abuse" is possible only upon motion of the court or of the United
States Trustee, a Department of Justice official who manages the liquidation of the debtor's
assets; creditors and interested parties may not request such a finding. See I 1 U.S.C. at
§ 707(b) (Supp. V 1999).
14See It U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
IS See id. § 522. The debtor may choose between exemptions provided by federal or
state law. See id. § 522(b). This exemption system is controversial. See infra note 46.
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contrast, debtors who file under Chapter Thirteen may retain most assets,
but must develop a plan to commit their disposable income to repayment
of debts over a three to five year period, 6 at the end of which the court
discharges any remaining debt. 17
The Bankruptcy Reform Act would abolish the debtor's voluntary
choice of chapter, replacing it with a means test designed "to ensure that
debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford."18 The bill would
require all bankruptcy filers to complete the test, though in general only
those with a family income above the state median would be denied ac-
cess to Chapter Seven.19 Under the bill's test, the debtor's monthly in-
come (defined as the monthly average of all income received during the
previous six months)20 multiplied by 60 (the number of months in five
years, the length of a typical Chapter Thirteen repayment plan under the
bill)21 is compared to the sum of the following five figures: (1) total "pri-
ority" debts, such as family support obligations; (2) scheduled payments
on secured debts over the next five years; (3) arrears on secured debts;
(4) monthly living expenses calculated on the basis of Internal Revenue
Service guidelines, multiplied by 60; and (5) an allowance for the ad-
ministrative costs of a Chapter Thirteen plan? 2 If the debtor's income
exceeds this sum by either (1) an amount equal to twenty-five percent of
remaining unsecured debts (unless the debtor could pay no more than
$100 a month toward these debts) or (2) $10,000, whichever is lower,
then the debtor faces a presumption of abuse which he or she may rebut
only by establishing that, due to "special circumstances," there is "no
reasonable alternative" to an adjustment in the debtor's income or expen-
diture. 13
While the means test is the Bankruptcy Reform Act's centerpiece, 24
it is not the only new restriction the bill would impose on bankruptcy
filing. The bill would also, for one, require debtors to obtain "credit
16See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994).
17 See id. § 1328 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
Is HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
19 See H.R. 333, § 102(a).20See H.R. 333, § 102(b). The calculation of monthly income excludes Social Security
benefits and reparation payments for victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity;
however, it includes all other sources of income whether or not they are taxable. See id.
21 See 511 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994). Whereas three years is the length of the typical
Chapter Thirteen plan under current law, the Bankruptcy Reform Act would make five
years the norm in an increased number of cases. See H.R. 333, § 318.
2 See H.R. 333, § 102(a).
2 See id. Chapter Seven access would be presumptively denied to a debtor with above-
average income who could pay all scheduled payments and arrears on priority obligations
plus at least $6,001 (more than $100 per month over five years) towards a $24,000 credit
card debt (four times the minimum payable amount). Chapter Seven would also be un-
available to a debtor who could pay all priority obligations plus $10,000 of a $10,001
credit card debt.
2 See HousE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2 (calling the means
test the bill's "heart").
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counseling" before filing.2 5 Under this provision, debtors could receive
bankruptcy relief only upon completion of "an instructional course con-
cerning personal financial management" given by an approved non-profit
counseling agency.26 For another, the bill would toughen the presump-
tions against discharge of debt obtained shortly before filing. Current law
permits creditors to challenge the discharge of any debt of $1,150 or
more for "luxury goods and services" that the debtor obtained from a
single creditor within sixty days of filing. 27 The Bankruptcy Reform Act
would reduce the amount for such presumptively non-dischargeable debts
to $250, while increasing the relevant time-span from sixty to ninety days
before bankruptcy.28 Similarly, whereas current law prevents the dis-
charge of debts from cash advances amounting to more than $1,150 if
they are incurred within sixty days of filing, 29 the Bankruptcy Reform Act
would lower that minimum amount to $750, while also shortening the
relevant time-period to seventy days.30 In addition, the bill would restrict
debtors' rights to stay debt payment by declaring bankruptcy.3 There is
evidence that some debtors make strategic use of the automatic stay af-
forded to filers under current law;32 some debtors apparently file succes-
sive Chapter Thirteen motions with no intention of completing a plan and
obtaining a discharge.3 3 The Bankruptcy Reform Act would curtail such
"abusive serial filing" by requiring a showing of good faith before grant-
ing a stay of more than thirty days to debtors who had filed and had their
case dismissed within the previous year.3 1
Because such changes to the mechanics of bankruptcy under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act could alter the relative advantages for competing
creditor groups, the bill would adjust the treatment of certain types of
debts in bankruptcy. Under current law, Chapter Seven filings are gener-
ally more advantageous for creditors holding secured debt. Chapter
25 H.R. 333, § 106. For critical analysis of the view that a credit counseling require-
ment would benefit debtors, see Howard B. Hoffman, Consumer Bankruptcy Filers and
Pre-Petition Consumer Credit Counseling: Is Congress Trying to Place the Fox in Charge
of the Henhouse?, 54 Bus. LAW. 1629, 1632 (1999) (indicating that, because existing
credit counseling agencies are funded by "voluntary contributions" from creditors, such
agencies may encourage debtors to undertake burdensome repayment budgets).
26H.R. 333, § 106(b)(3) (adding the counseling requirement to Chapter Seven); id.
§ 106(c) (adding the requirement to Chapter Thirteen).
21 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (LEXIS through 2001 legislation).28 See H.R. 333, § 310.
29 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (LEXIS through 2001 legislation).
30 See H.R. 333, § 310.
31 Id. § 302.32 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
33 See Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AI.
BANKR. L.J. 483, 502-03 (1997).
34 H.R. 333, § 302. Debtors who file more than twice within a year would have to show
good faith by clear and convincing evidence. See id. See generally Scott F. Norberg, Con-
sumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in
Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 415, 427 (1999) (describing the abusive serial
filing provisions).
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Seven debtors often agree to reaffirm secured debts so as to keep the un-
derlying collateral, such as an automobile or appliance being purchased
in installments. Many even accept agreements that require them to pay an
outstanding balance that exceeds the value of the collateral property.35
Meanwhile, unsecured lenders, such as credit card issuers, tend to lose
out when assets are liquidated under Chapter Seven because unsecured
debt is generally a low priority for repayment.3 6
By contrast, Chapter Thirteen is more advantageous to unsecured
lenders. As an incentive for debtors to file under Chapter Thirteen rather
than Seven, secured debts on assets other than the debtor's home may be
"stripped down" from the amount of the outstanding balance to the re-
placement value of the property.37 Thus, whereas secured creditors may
often obtain reaffirmation of the full value of their lien against a Chapter
Seven debtor, the value of secured debts may be substantially reduced if
the debtor files under Chapter Thirteen. Meanwhile, both secured and
unsecured debt are included in the repayment plan, so unsecured lenders
may receive repayment of debts that would have been discharged under
Chapter Seven.38
35 See Warren, supra note 33, at 499 (noting that "more than forty percent of the debt-
ors have been willing to sign on [to reaffirmation agreements]" even though those agree-
ments typically require them to repay not only the secured portion of the debt, but also the
unsecured portion, that is, the portion in excess of the value of the collateral).
Reaffirmation agreements are permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). In
an empirical study, Marianne Culhane and Michaela White found that twenty-eight percent
of Chapter Seven debtors had "one or more reaffirmation agreements in the court file:'
Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt after Discharge: An Empirical Study of
Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 720 (1999). These figures might understate the
level of reaffirmation, since there is evidence that many creditors obtained illegal "rogue
reaffirmations" requiring debtors to repay loans without reporting the agreement to the
court. Id. at 717-18. Many debtors in their sample also appeared to have retained assets
through "ride-through" arrangements that permitted them to continue payments on items
purchased on credit with the creditor retaining a right to repossess the item. Id. at 713.
Culhane and White conclude that many Chapter Seven filers reaffirmed more debt than
they could afford to pay; moreover, many reaffirmed debts on household items that were
"unsecured for all practical purposes" since "the collateral was unlikely to be repossessed:'
Id. at 764.36See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Unsecured lenders have some-
times succeeded in obtaining reaffirmations of debt in return for promises of credit fol-
lowing bankruptcy. See Culhane and White, supra note 35, at 730; see also Scott F. Nor-
berg, supra note 34, at 421 ("While unsecured creditors rarely realize any payment through
liquidation of unencumbered, non-exempt property, they routinely receive at least some
repayment through reaffirmations and non-dischargeability determinations.").37 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994) (permitting the court to "modify the rights of se-
cured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is
the debtor's principle residence"). Courts have interpreted this provision in conjunction
with § 506(a), which provides that debt in excess of the value of the collateral may be
treated as unsecured debt if another provision of the code permits modification of the lien.
See, e.g., In re Byington, 197 B.R. 130, 133 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996); see also Corinne Ball
& Jacqueline B. Stuart, The Battle Over Bankruptcy Law for the New Millennium, 55 Bus.
LAw. 1487, 1496-97 (2000).38 See generally Norberg, supra note 34, at 424-26.
2002]
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Forcing debtors to file under Chapter Thirteen could disadvantage
secured creditors if it eliminated reaffirmation opportunities that would
have arisen under Chapter Seven. The Bankruptcy Reform Act compen-
sates for this effect by restricting the debtor's opportunity to strip down
undersecured debts in Chapter Thirteen. For automobile purchase loans
made within five years of bankruptcy or for other personal property pur-
chased within one year, debtors would no longer be permitted to bifur-
cate the replacement value from the remaining unsecured portion of the
loan; the bill would instead require debtors to include the full value of
such creditor liens in their repayment plan.3 9 Further, the bill would re-
quire reaffirmation agreements to include extensive information about the
debtor's rights,4" and would instruct United States Attorneys and the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation to take responsibility for enforcing laws
against abusive reaffirmation practices.4
Finally, the Bankruptcy Reform Act would amend the Truth-in-
Lending Act ("TILA")4 2 to require new disclosures from creditors. In
particular, it would require credit card billing statements to disclose in-
formation on the amount of time required to pay off a hypothetical bal-
ance by making minimum monthly payments. 41 Card issuers would be
required to provide a toll-free telephone number from which card-holders
could obtain information on the amount of time required to pay off their
own account balance with minimum payments.' Additionally, credit card
solicitations and applications would be required to include information
"clearly and conspicuously" on the mechanics and duration of introduc-
tory "teaser" interest rates. 5
In sum, the Bankruptcy Reform Act would restrict access to Chapter
Seven, limit the debt discharge, impose new burdens on bankruptcy filers,
and eliminate strip-down, while offering consumers the benefit of addi-
tional disclosures from consumer creditors. 6 With the exception of the
" See H.R. 333, § 306. House Bill 333, section 304 also bars debtors and creditors
from agreeing to let secured claims "ride-through" bankruptcy, as they may under current
law. See Culhane & White, supra note 35, at 718-20 (describing "ride-through" options
under current law).
40 See H.R. 333, § 203(a).
11 See id. § 203(b); See also Culhane & White, supra note 35, at 717-18 (describing
abusive reaffirmation practices by creditors).
42 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1994).
41 See H.R. 333, § 1301(a). Credit card lending arrangements often involve "negative
amortization"; that is to say, credit card lenders often set minimum monthly payments
below interest charges, with the result that a debtor's total outstanding debt may increase
while the debtor makes the minimum payments. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH VAR-
REN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT
247-48 (2000).
44See H.R. 333, § 1301(a).
451d. § 1303.
46 The Bankruptcy Reform Act is a complex and detailed piece of legislation. This Es-
say discusses only the most significant and controversial changes the bill would make to
current bankruptcy law. See generally Ball & Stuart, supra note 37. One controversial fea-
[Vol. 39
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TILA amendments, all of these changes "move in the same direction":
they strengthen the position of creditors while weakening that of debtors.47
The rationale for this package of reforms is twofold. First, propo-
nents of the bill attribute the explosive increase in bankruptcy filing to
abuse of current law by unscrupulous debtors. 4 Easy access to Chapter
Seven, the argument goes, has eroded the "stigma" traditionally associ-
ated with bankruptcy, leading to the use of the bankruptcy system as a
tool of financial planning, rather than as a last resort.49 Bankruptcy laws,
it follows, must be toughened to curb this practice.50 Second, proponents
argue that reform will have beneficial effects for responsible borrowers
ture of current law that the bill may not change significantly bears mention. Under current
law, debtors may exempt assets from the bankruptcy estate according to either federal or
state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Some wealthy debtors have used
this feature of bankruptcy law strategically, changing their state of residence before bank-
ruptcy so as to gain a more generous exemption. See G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost
of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 229 (2000) (referring to "'high
profile' cases in which wealthy individuals move to states with generous exemption re-
gimes in order to obtain a discharge while shielding vast portions of their assets from
creditors.'). For instance, a debtor who moves from New Jersey, which provides no state-
law homestead exemption, to Florida, which provides an unlimited homestead exemption,
may shield substantial assets from creditors by purchasing an expensive home. See Ball &
Stuart, supra note 37, at 1499-1500. Critics argue that this opportunity for pre-bankruptcy
planning by the wealthy undermines public confidence in the fairness and legitimacy of the
system. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, supra note 33, at 493-94. While the Senate version of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act would impose a cap of $125,000 on homestead exemptions,
see Senate Bill 420 § 308, the House bill would make no such change, and President Bush
has indicated that he opposes the Senate language. See Senate Votes to Invoke Cloture on
Motion to Proceed to Bankruptcy, CONG. DAILY, July 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL
24848595.
47 Bankruptcy Reform: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Ad-
ministrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 103
(1999) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Profes-
sor, Harvard Law School).
48 See, e.g., id. (statement of Todd Zywicki, Professor, George Mason University
School of Law) ("Bankruptcy is a moral as well as an economic act. There is a conscious
decision not to keep one's promises. It is a decision not to reciprocate a benefit received, a
good deed done on the promise that you will reciprocate. Promise-keeping and reciprocity
are the foundation of an economy and healthy civil society?'), quoted in HOUSE JUDICARY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
49 S. REP. No. 106-49, at 2-3 ("A decreased moral stigma associated with bankruptcy
means that filing for bankruptcy is not viewed as a last resort for financially troubled
Americans who need debt forgiveness .... Individuals who would have struggled to meet
their financial obligations in the past are filing bankruptcy today in record numbers?')
(footnotes omitted); see also 146 CONG. REC. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2000) (statement of
Sen. Hatch (R-Utah)) ("Not long ago in our Nation's past, there was an expectation that
people should repay what they have borrowed. Hand in hand with this expectation was a
stigma that attached to those who filed bankruptcy .... Our current system, I am sorry to
say, allows some people who are able to repay their debts to avoid doing so!'). See gener-
ally supra note 7.
50 See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Memorandum Re: S. 420, The Bank-
ruptcy Reform Bill (Mar. 14 2001) ("There's plenty of blame to go around for the 100
percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings in the last ten years. Part of the prob-
lem is bankruptcy laws that are too lax.'), at http://www.senate.gov/-grassley/releases/
2001/p01r3-14d.htm.
2002]
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who pay back their loans. Under current law, responsible borrowers pay
high interest rates to subsidize losses from the discharged debt of their
less responsible peers." A reform that limits access to debt discharge
should lower interest rates, reformers argue, since it would prevent reck-
less borrowers from shifting the costs of their activity onto other borrow-
ers.5 2 Lower interest rates, in turn, would benefit the economy by facili-
tating responsible spending and investment. 3
Opponents of the Bankruptcy Reform Act contest both rationales
given in support of the reform bill. They argue, first, that lenders, not
borrowers, are to blame for bankruptcy increases, since their lending
practices have fostered the indebtedness that places households at risk of
bankruptcy. 4 Opponents also question whether bankruptcy reform will
lower interest rates for responsible borrowers." They suggest, rather, that
commercial lenders will be the principal beneficiaries of the bill, since it
will afford them increased opportunities for debt collection. 6
The first ground for disagreement relates to the causes of bank-
ruptcy. On that count, one fact is clear: Americans have taken on unman-
ageable levels of debt in recent years. Indeed, the data on this point are
overwhelming: total household debt in the United States increased from
sixty-five percent of total income to eighty-one percent between 1980
and 1994.1' During roughly the same period, households increased their
total home mortgage and consumer installment debts by more than 400
51 See, e.g., HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5 (indicating that
"financial losses attributable to bankruptcy filings in 1997 exceeded $44 billion"); 147
CONG. REC. H134 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001) (statement of Rep. Gekas (R-Pa.)) (indicating
the $44 billion in losses from bankruptcy "equal[s] more than $400 per household"); 147
CONG. REC. S1811 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2001) (statement of Sen. Sessions (R-AIa.)) ("When
somebody fails to pay what they owe. ... what happens? It drives up the cost of... peo-
ple's business. They have to raise the charges on the honest people who pay them.").
52 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REc. S1807 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2001) (Statement of Sen. Gras-
sley (R-Iowa)) ("The result of the bankruptcy crisis is that hard-working, law-abiding
Americans have to pay higher prices for goods and services. [The Bankruptcy Reform Act]
makes it harder for individuals who can repay their debts to file for bankruptcy under
chapter 7 where their debts are wiped away. This would lessen the upward pressure on
interest rates and higher prices.").
'3 See, e.g., id. ("Bankruptcy reform will help our economy through lower interest
rates.")
14 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S2028 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2001) (statement of Sen. Durbin
(D-Ill.)) ("[Proponents of the Bankruptcy Reform Act] argued that the people who were
filing for bankruptcy had forgotten the moral stigma of declaring bankruptcy in America
.... Shouldn't the moral stigma be on the conscience of these lenders who have dragged
these poor unsuspecting people into a situation where they have no hope and nowhere else
to turn?").
" See, e.g., JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS, supra note 9, at 458 ("[W]e
have never received any evidence that the credit card industry likely would pass on any of
the 'savings' from bankruptcy law changes to individual consumers.").
56 See, e.g., id. at 460 ("[The Bankruptcy Reform Act] would institute a number of
major changes to consumer bankruptcy ... that are designed to increase pay-outs to non-
priority unsecured creditors, particularly credit card companies, as well as certain secured
lenders, especially those extending credit for automobile loans.").
" SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 18
[Vol. 39
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percent.58 Thus, "real consumer debt has risen dramatically over a long
period during which real incomes for many people have stayed the same
or declined?' 5 9 In addition, according to one survey, bankruptcy filers in
1997 had an average debt-to-income ratio of 2.76, with the average bur-
den of non-mortgage debt totaling 1.87 times annual income ° During
2000, the American savings rate was negative for the first time since the
Great Depression.6 1
The explanation for these trends is not obvious, however. On the one
hand, some research supports the reformers' claim that a shift in borrow-
ers' attitudes is to blame. For instance, one recent study concludes that
"the explosion in bankruptcy filings is in substantial part attributable to a
shift in social norms," not legal and economic variables.62 In the authors'
view the most plausible explanation for increasing debt is "a decline in
social sanctions"-that is, in stigma associated with bankruptcy.6 Media
reports of debtors filing for bankruptcy without compunction also suggest
that social attitudes toward bankruptcy have changed.6' Moreover, other
research shows that increases in the rate of bankruptcy filing have corre-
lated strongly with increased expenditures on legal advertising following
a 1977 Supreme Court decision 65 that struck down restrictions on such
advertising on free speech grounds. 6 While "it is difficult to establish a
causal relationship,"67 lawyer advertisements for bankruptcy services may
have contributed to a decline in social stigma by presenting bankruptcy
filing in a more positive light.68
On the other hand, declining stigma does not appear to be a com-
plete explanation. Some research indicates that about fifteen times as
many American households could benefit from bankruptcy as actually
file.69 Socio-cultural deterrents may afford at least a partial explanation
581d.
59 1d.
60Id. at 70-71 tbl.2.5.
61 See Dolores Kong, Many Seen at Risk in a Downturn: Personal Debt Soars While
Savings Plunge, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 2001, at Al.
62F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187,
188 (1998).
63 Id. at 206.
64 See, e.g., Kim Clark, Why So Many Americans Are Going Bankrupt?, FORTUNE,
Aug. 4, 1997, at 24; see also Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-
Testing, 1999 BYU L. REv. 177, 215-21 (1999) (quoting in part Clark, supra, at 24-25).
But see SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 32 ("Arguments that the stigma attached to
bankruptcy has declined are typically made by journalists who are unable to find any bank-
ruptcy debtors willing to be interviewed for the record and by prosperous economists who
see bankruptcy as a great bargain.") (footnote omitted).
65 Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
66 See Diane Ellis, The Influence of Legal Factors on Personal Bankruptcy Filings,
BANK TRENDS 98-103 (FDIC, Division of Insurance), Feb. 1998, available at http://www.
fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank.
671d. at9.
68 See id. at 2.
69 See White, supra note 2, at 205.
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for this anomaly.7" Indeed, some commentators doubt whether the stigma
of bankruptcy has declined significantly.7' Furthermore, changes in the
culture and regulation of consumer lending appear to have played some
role in bankruptcy increases. Bankruptcy levels have closely tracked
overall levels of consumer debt,12 which have risen rapidly with the bur-
geoning of the consumer credit industry beginning in 1978."3 In that year,
the Supreme Court made possible the modern credit card industry by
permitting lenders to charge the highest interest rate available in any state
to credit card borrowers throughout the country.74 Credit was once all but
unavailable for consumers who were too risky for loans within the regu-
lated interest rate of their state.75 Today, however, lenders bombard con-
sumers across the United States with some three billion credit card so-
licitations annually-forty-one per household-spending roughly $100 in
solicitation costs for each new card-holder.76 Unlike traditional lenders,
credit card companies do not base lending decisions on a careful analysis
of the borrower's creditworthiness; rather, they extend credit on an "actu-
arial basis," targeting entire demographic groups and charging interest
rates as high as twenty-four percent to cover the risk that some borrowers
"'Cff SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 32 ("Discharging debts that were honestly
incurred seems the antithesis of middle-class morality. Public identification as a bankrupt
debtor is embarrassing at best, devastating at worst. Bankrupt debtors have told us of their
efforts to conceal their bankruptcy."). But see White, supra note 2, at 229 (postulating that
debtors do not file "because they obtain the benefits of bankruptcy without bearing the
costs of filings, since creditors do not attempt to collect.").
11 See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 32.
7' See JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS, supra note 9, at 478 (noting that
"there is an almost perfect correlation between the increasing amount of consumer debt
and the number of consumer bankruptcy filings"); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note
43, at 129 ("Bankruptcy filing rates and consumer debt to income ratios rise and fall to-
gether over time."); Paul C. Bishop, A Time Series Model of the U.S. Personal Bankruptcy
Rate, BANK TRENDS 98-101, (FDIC, Division of Insurance), Feb. 1998 (estimating the
influence of consumer indebtedness and business cycle activity on the bankruptcy rate and
concluding that "approximately two-thirds of the increase in bankruptcies can be explained
by these two factors alone"), available at http:/www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bankl
bt_9801.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
71 See JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS, supra note 8, at 478 (chart shows
rapid increase in consumer debt levels from the 1970s to the present).
74 Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis vt First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299
(1978) (holding that usury laws regulating interstate lending are a policy matter for
Congress to decide). See generally Dianne Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate
Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate,
BANK TRENDS 98-105 (FDIC, Division of Insurance), Mar. 1998 (arguing that Marquette
"fundamentally altered the market for credit card loans in a way that significantly
expanded the availability of credit and increased the average risk profile of borrowers,"
leading to "a substantial expansion in credit card availability, a reduction in average credit
quality, and a secular increase in personal bankruptcies."), available at http://wwv.fdic.
gov/banklanalytical/banklbt_9805.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
7 See Ellis, supra note 74, at 4 ("[I]n a regime of restrictive usury ceilings, where
lenders' income potential was limited, lenders extended credit only to higher-quality bor-
rowers, and poorer quality borrowers were shut out of the market.").
"See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 135.
[Vol. 39
Recent Developments
in the group will be unable to pay.77 Thus, credit is widely and easily
available to consumers, regardless of creditworthiness. What is more,
consumers may incur debts incrementally by charging purchases to their
card without ever having to apply deliberately for a loan.7 The result is
that consumers have taken on more debt than ever before, with personal
bankruptcy rates rising proportionally.79 Aggressive efforts by lenders to
extend credit card usage to new demographic groups, including low-
income borrowers in the "subprime" market, 0 suggest that the rise in
consumer indebtedness will be an ongoing trend.8'
In addition to the increasing availability of credit, structural eco-
nomic changes may be inducing households to take on more debt and
increase their risk of bankruptcy. Increasing income inequality has pro-
duced a situation in which more families must borrow in order to main-
tain a "middle-class" lifestyle.82 The ill effects of this trend are com-
pounded by the fact that rising divorce rates and decreasing job security
have increased the risk that families will undergo financial shocks that
cause them to fall behind in debt payments. 3 Meanwhile, the combina-
tion of consumer advertising pressures with a deeply ingrained culture of
"rising expectations"-the presumption that household welfare will im-
prove as careers advance-makes it difficult for many Americans to save
funds. Their lack of savings, in turn, leaves Americans ill-prepared for
future calamities, let alone the belt-tightening that may be required in the
case of more mundane problems such as diminished salary, layoff, tem-
porary unemployment, or divorce. 8 Thus, the consumer credit industry
has come to function as a form of private wage insurance which provides
emergency funds to households in distress.Y In this capacity, the industry
finances the losses of families who go bankrupt by charging high interest
n Id. at 246-47. Eighteen percent is the average interest rate, but credit card issuers
often raise the rate to twenty-four percent or higher for borrowers who fall behind in pay-
ments. Id. at 18-19.
78 See id. at 130.
79 A comparison between Canada and the United States suggests that credit-card lend-
ing has played a substantial role in consumer debt and bankruptcy increases. Modem credit
cards were introduced in the mid-1960s in both the United States and Canada, but states
regulated interest rates in the United States until the 1978 Marquette decision, whereas
Canadian interest rates have been deregulated since at least 1886. See Ellis, supra note 74,
at 9. The Canadian and American personal bankruptcy rates have both risen dramatically in
the past twenty years, yet the Canadian rate rose immediately following the introduction of
credit cards-rising by 340% between 1966 and 1976-while the American rate took off
only after the Marquette decision made widespread marketing of credit cards profitable in
the United States. See id. at 9-10; see also JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS,
supra note 9, at 479.
90 Timothy L. O'Brien, Lowering the Credit Fence: Big Players are Jumping Into the
Risky Loan Business, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1997, at Dl.
81 See Ellis, supra note 74, at 10.
8 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 28-33.
83 See id. at 75-107, 172-98.
94 See id. at 22-26.85See id. at 138.
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rates to those who manage to recover and repay some or all of their
debts.8 6
In the view of critics of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the role of
structural economic trends and creditor behavior in the recent bankruptcy
boom argues against the bill's focus on discouraging bankruptcy by
strengthening creditor protections. The dissenters on the House Judiciary
Committee contend that "the vast weight of the data and studies contra-
dict [sic] the proponents' rationales and instead shows that non bank-
ruptcy law factors are the root cause of increased bankruptcy law filings.""7
Reforms to benefit creditors are inappropriate, critics argue, for they
benefit credit card lenders and other creditors who have helped create the
bankruptcy crisis while burdening "vulnerable groups" that find them-
selves in debt as a result of financial and economic forces beyond their
control.88
Most Senators and Representatives, however, appear to have been
more persuaded by the contrary view that deterrents should be directed at
borrowers, not lenders, notwithstanding any role lenders have played in
fostering current bankruptcy levels. It may be that structural economic
changes are the causes of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the argument goes, if
consumers are using the bankruptcy system to avoid the consequences of
irresponsible purchases or to support unrealistic financial expectations,
then it is appropriate for Congress to encourage saving and restraint by
sending a "moral signal" that debts must be repaid.8 9 For many reformers,
the prospect of an economic recession adds force to this view since the
risk of bankruptcy will likely increase for many households during hard
times. 90 As for the concerns about vulnerable groups, the bill's means test
purports to address them by ensuring that the bill adversely affects only
those debtors who fail the means test and do not "need" Chapter Seven
relief.91 Thus, proponents have been able to present the bill as "balanced,"
notwithstanding critics' concerns about its generosity to creditors. 92
86 See id.
87 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS, supra note 9, at 457.
88 Id. at 455.
89 Jones & Zywicki, supra note 64, at 191.
9°See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S 1806 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2001) (statement of Sen. Gras-
sley (R-Iowa)) ("If we hit a recession without fixing the bankruptcy system, we could face
a situation where bankruptcies spiral out of control even beyond what they were in the
good times of 1998, 1997, and 1996.").
9' See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H133 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001) (statement of Rep. Gekas
(R-Pa.)) ("[House Bill 333] is tailored to make certain that anyone who is so overwhelmed
by debt, so swamped by the inability to pay one's [sic] obligations ... [is entitled] to be
discharged in bankruptcy, to be free from the debts that so overwhelmed him."); Jones &
Zywicki, supra note 64, at 207 ("Apocalyptic rhetoric to the contrary, the reality of means-
testing is that it will apply only to bankruptcy filers with above median incomes, sufficient
disposable income to fund a plan, the ability to repay a substantial portion of their unse-
cured debt, and no other overriding hardship.").
92 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S1807-08 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Grassley (R-Iowa)) ("[Cilaims that this bill is unbalanced for the creditor and against the
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act's likely effects are no less contested
than the explanations for current bankruptcy trends. Reformers claim that
the Bankruptcy Reform Act will be beneficial to consumers because
toughened debt collection will lead to lower borrowing costs. There is
some doubt, however, as to whether credit card interest rates are suffi-
ciently competitive to respond to bankruptcy reforms. Despite deep mar-
ket penetration and intense competition for new customers,93 credit card
issuers generally compete by offering perks such as purchasing discounts
and frequent flier miles, not by offering lower interest rates.94 Thus, while
bank borrowing rates fell from 13.4% to 3.5% between 1980 and 1992,
the average credit card interest rate rose from 17.3% to 17.8%.15 In an
influential article, economist Lawrence Ausubel has speculated that this
"stickiness" occurs because many consumers deceive themselves about
the likelihood they will carry a balance on their credit cards: they fail to
seek out lower rates though it would be in their interest to do so. 96 Other
commentators have suggested that interest rates remain high because the
consumers who carry credit card balances are not savvy enough to appre-
ciate the importance of the interest rate, while more sophisticated card-
holders generally use cards only for convenience and do not carry ac-
count balances.97
The disclosure requirements included in the Bankruptcy Reform Act
could mitigate such problems by exposing credit cards' use of low mini-
mum payments and high interest rates to keep consumers in debt.98 It is
doubtful, however, whether the inclusion of further fine-print disclosures
on credit card materials would have any significant impact on consumer
behavior.99 Moreover, if Ausubel is correct about borrower self-
deception, then it is likely that consumers would persist in ignoring in-
terest rate information, permitting card issuers to continue to charge un-
competitive rates.
On the other hand, some reform proponents have argued that the low
transaction costs of credit card borrowing justify the high interest rates.' °°
There is also evidence that consumers have begun to take note of interest
rates, shifting balances between cards to exploit introductory "teaser"
rates and reduce monthly payments. 1 1 If credit card interest rates are
debtor are wrong. There are enhanced consumer protection and information and education
provisions....").
93 See supra text accompanying note 76.
94 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 254.
95 Id. at 255 (quoting JAMES MEDOFF & ANDREW HARLESS, THE INDEBTED SOCIETY:
ANATOMY OF AN ONGOING DISASTER 12 (1996)).
96 Lawrence Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, AM.
ECON. REV. Vol. 81, No. 1, at 50, 70-71 (Mar. 1991).
97 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 255.
98 See id. at 247-48.
99 See Ball & Stuart, supra note 37, at 1503-04.
'
10 See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 64, at 228-31.
01 See Jeff Bailey & Scott Kilman, Taking Credit: Here's What's Driving Some Lend-
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economically reasonable, or are becoming so, then responsible borrowers
might reap benefits from toughened bankruptcy laws. Still, the remark-
able profitability of consumer lending 0 2 and the prevalence of high inter-
est rates have led some members of Congress to doubt whether "the
credit card industry likely would pass on any of the 'savings' from bank-
ruptcy law changes to individual consumers."'0 3
There is also debate as to whether the Bankruptcy Reform Act would
produce significant benefits for creditors. As Professor Elizabeth Warren
has observed:
Bankruptcy is the ultimate zero-sum system. Creditors compete
for the limited dollars of the people who have declared them-
selves bankrupt. More to one creditor is necessarily less for an-
other. "
Yet the Bankruptcy Reform Act avoids choosing between creditors; to the
contrary, it flattens distinctions between them by toughening presump-
tions against dischargeability and blocking the bifurcation of underse-
cured debts. The result, in the words of Senator Feingold (D-Wis.), "is a
bill at war with itself'-more creditors competing for the same funds." 5
This competition could mean that creditors end up collecting little more
than they would under current law. One analyst has concluded that in-
creasing secured creditors' claims under Chapter Thirteen by preventing
strip-down would "reduce distributions to unsecured creditors in Chapter
13, eliminating them in many cases."'0 6 This possibility raises further
doubts about the effect on interest rates: if unsecured lenders do not
benefit from the bill, there will be no cost savings for them to pass on to
consumers. On the other hand, if unsecured creditors receive more, se-
cured creditors might receive less than they would have through Chapter
Seven reaffirmation agreements, with the result that the costs of secured
borrowing-for instance, automobile financing-could rise.
Critics are particularly concerned about the bill's implications for
priority creditors such as former spouses and local tax authorities.0 7 The
ers Crazy: Borrowers Who Think Working Class Is Getting Hip to Lower Interest Rates:
Card Surfing Is the Rage, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1998, at Al.
102 See Lawrence Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy,
71 Ar. BANKR. L.J. 249, 258-59 (1997). In part because of the high interest rates charged,
financial institutions earn higher profits from credit cards than any other lending activity.
See id.
" JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS, supra note 9, at 458.
"I Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 47 (statement of Elizabeth Warren).
lo 145 CONG. REC. S14,067 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feingold (D-
Wis.)) (commenting on an earlier version of the bill in the 106th Congress).
l"1 Norberg, supra note 34, at 462.
7 See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S 14,067 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. Fein-
gold (D-Wis.)) ("In too many cases, I am afraid, [the bill] will hinder families' ability to
meet other obligations, particularly their obligations to their own children and to local
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House Judiciary Committee Report stresses that "[d]omestic support
claimants receive a broad spectrum of special protections" under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act.1"8 Like current law, the bill assigns priority
status to family support .obligations' °9 and taxes, 10 rendering them non-
dischargeable along with certain other debts such as educational loans."'
Critics worry, however, that since the bill expands the definition of non-
dischargeable cash advances and consumer loans, it may place "the sin-
gle mother seeking money for food into direct competition with credit
card debt."" 2 Furthermore, by pushing debtors into Chapter Thirteen
while restricting their right to re-file if their plans fail, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act may make it more difficult for priority creditors to collect
what they are owed. Roughly two-thirds of Chapter Thirteen plans fail
under current law;" 3 analysts predict the success rate would remain low
under the reform bill.'1 4 When a debtor's Chapter Thirteen plan fails,
creditors may resume efforts to collect outstanding debts, deploying tac-
tics ranging from letters, phone calls, and visits by collection agents to
state law collection procedures, such as wage garnishment and asset
foreclosure." 5 In such circumstances, families and other priority creditors
may lose out in the competition with more assertive and experienced debt
collection professionals.1 6 Some debtors who might meet their priority
obligations following a Chapter Seven discharge may instead end up
paying their limited funds to non-priority creditors who are more asser-
tive following the failure of a Chapter Thirteen plan.
A final important argument concerning the likely effects of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act pertains to the costs of the bill for litigants and
for the bankruptcy system. Since Chapter Thirteen plans require ongoing
court supervision, Chapter Thirteen cases generally involve higher law-
yer fees and court costs than Chapter Seven cases." 7 Thus, an increase in
taxing authorities.").
l08 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMIITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.
109 See H.R. 333, §§ 211-15.
110 See id. § 705.
" See id. § 220.
112 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS, supra note 9, at 475.
113 See Norberg, supra note 34, at 439; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 14.
"
4 See Norberg, supra note 34, at 450-51. While the Bankruptcy Reform Act's means-
test might be expected to improve the success rate by pushing higher-income debtors into
Chapter Thirteen, Norberg's empirical examination of Chapter Thirteen cases found no
correlation between income and plan completion. See id. Norberg goes on to say conclude
that "[t]he essential unpredictability of success in chapter 13 undermines the case for
means-testing." See id.; see also Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bank-
ruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's
Proposals as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 1, 11 (1998) ("The impact of
stricter means testing would likely include a higher failure rate [for Chapter Thirteen
cases].").
15 See White, supra note 2, at 211-12 (describing creditors' legal remedies against
debtors who default).
116 See JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS, supra note 9, at 472-75.
117 See Norberg, supra note 34, at 436.
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Chapter Thirteen filings may impose higher costs on the bankruptcy sys-
tem, while also increasing the proportion of debtors' assets that go to
lawyers rather than creditors. Additionally, the Bankruptcy Reform Act's
means test may be expensive to administer. One study based on an earlier
version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act"' found that only 3.6% of Chapter
Seven debtors would pass the means test and qualify as "can-pays" who
should instead have been in Chapter Thirteen." 9 If the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act's means test would filter out only a small proportion of Chapter
Seven debtors, then, in the view of some critics, the costs of administer-
ing the test may outweigh the benefits.121
Whether the means test is worthwhile despite its costs may depend
on a value judgment. In the Committee Report on the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, both the majority and the dissenters cite the 3.6% figure to support
their views; this suggests the two sides assign different values to the so-
cial importance of pushing a small proportion of "can-pays" out of
Chapter Seven.12 ' At a time when many households are taking on unman-
ageable levels of debt, it may be important for the bankruptcy system to
send a strong signal that debtors who can pay must do so.1'2 2 Furthermore,
one scholar has suggested that many courts already apply an ad hoc in-
come test in making determinations of Chapter Seven abuse. If that is the
case, then the universal application of a "mechanical test" could enhance
the bankruptcy system's clarity and efficiency.1
3
The administrative hurdle of a means test could possibly lead debt-
ors outside of the 3.6% to file under Chapter Thirteen even though they
could qualify for Chapter Seven. As one commentator predicts, "[s]ome
I "H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998).
119 Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy
Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 27, 31 (1999). While research funded by the credit card industry has suggested that
more than ten percent of Chapter Seven debtors would qualify as "can-pays" independent
academics, as well as the General Accounting Office have criticized these results. See id. at
28-31 (describing industry-funded research and the debate over the results). But see Jones
& Zywicki, supra note 64, at 186-200 (criticizing the Culhane & White study and arguing
for the industry-funded research).
1 2 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 47, at 1 (statement of Prof. War-
ren) ("A good example of the failure of cost-benefit analysis is evident in the proposed
means test.").
12' See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5-6 n.18 (quoting the
Culhane & White study to support the proposition that "debtors can, in fact, repay a
significant portion of their debts"); see also JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DISSENTING VIEWS,
supra note 9, at 458 (referring to the figure as "a mere 3.6%").
122 See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 64, at 191-92 ("[T]o the extent that there are
doubts about the administrative savings that would result from a bright-line statutory
means-testing requirement or about the number of individuals who would qualify under
means-testing, this moral message [that debts must be repaid] must also be put on the scale
in favor of means-testing.").
121 Felsenfeld, supra note 13, at 1402; see also Jones & Zywicki, supra note 64, at 205
("[S]tatutory-based means testing would substitute a bright-line rule for the current murky
standard. In general, bright-line rules tend to reduce administrative costs relative to stan-
dards and increase the predictability of their application.") (footnotes omitted).
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lawyers would avoid the expense of dealing with abuse or eligibility
challenges by putting nearly all clients in chapter 13."124 Lawyers work-
ing for low-income clients on a fixed fee might have little incentive to
complete the work required to establish Chapter Thirteen eligibility;
meanwhile, debtors filing without representation might find the paper-
work discouraging or impossible. As a result, debtors who could qualify
for Chapter Seven may end up filing under Chapter Thirteen instead.
Given the poor success rate of Chapter Thirteen plans, such debtors
might spend years cycling in and out of repayment plans, struggling to
pay debts that should have been discharged under Chapter Seven. 25
This possibility indicates what may be at stake in Congress' efforts
to overhaul the American bankruptcy system. The United States is unique
among modem western states in offering its citizens the right to clear
their debts and start over.126 This "fresh start" policy has traditionally
been seen as a component of America's entrepreneurial, free-market
culture: bankruptcy discharge promotes risk-taking by protecting fail-
ures; it ensures that no individual's productivity is dampened by the
prospect of earning income only to pay off old debts. 27 Western Euro-
pean countries have generally opted instead to compensate for economic
risks by providing a generous social safety net.2 8 A bankruptcy reform
that pushes more debtors into unsuccessful Chapter Thirteen plans would
place the United States in the novel position of offering its citizens nei-
ther the social protections of European states, nor the power to borrow
during emergencies and clear debts through bankruptcy. 129
'2 Braucher, supra note 114, at 11.
2 See id; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 253-54 (describing proposals to
push debtors out of Chapter Seven as "a social experiment that could get very ugly"). The
possibility that many Chapter Seven debtors may end up filing unsuccessful Chapter Thir-
teen plans may explain why the credit card industry has lobbied so aggressively for a
means test. See Warren, supra note 33, at 503-06 (indicating that the credit card industry
advocated means-testing even before specific means test proposals were developed). Some
research suggests unsecured creditors would get little more under Chapter Thirteen plans
than they do now in Chapter Seven cases. See supra text accompanying note 106. Since
most Chapter Thirteen plans fail, however, the displacement of Chapter Seven filers into
Chapter Thirteen would mean in practice that credit card lenders could at least pursue
debtors out of court, where their experience and sophistication may give them an advan-
tage over other creditors. See supra text accompanying notes 115-116; see also Jones &
Zywicki, supra note 64, at 191 ("If there really were no benefit to unsecured creditors from
channeling more debtors into Chapter 13 payment plans, the credit industry would not be
advocating means-testing.") (footnotes omitted).
126 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 257-59.
17 See id. at 258; see also Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy
Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393 (1985) (arguing that the fresh start policy is justified by psy-
chological tendencies to underestimate the social costs of risky decisions and to trade fu-
ture costs for present benefits); John M. Czarnetsky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory
of Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 393 (2000) (arguing that debt discharge by the
bankruptcy system protects entrepreneurship, creating net benefits for society).
,28 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 257.
29 Cf id. at 257-59 (comparing the European and American models and concluding
"the need for a more protective consumer bankruptcy law is directly proportional to the
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Given that debtor abuse may not be the sole explanation for high
bankruptcy levels, and that interest rate reductions may not be the princi-
ple effect of restrictions on debt discharge, the Bankruptcy Reform Act
shortchanges the complexity of the issues facing the American bank-
ruptcy system. Toughened bankruptcy laws may deter some borrowing,
but for any debtors who continue to accumulate unmanageable debts, the
bankruptcy system will face the same choice it has faced throughout
American history: it can demand that debtors repay what they can, or it
can permit them to clear some debts and make a fresh start. Credit card
companies and other lenders have earned healthy profits in a system that
reflects the latter choice. Indeed, it is unclear creditors could earn much
more in a system that restricts debt discharge; after all, debtors' resources
are limited, however large their debts. 130 The question the Bankruptcy
Reform Act raises is whether such marginal benefits to lenders are worth
the cost of preventing millions of families from putting their financial
misfortunes behind them.
-Zachary Price
size of the social safety net and the availability of consumer credit").
""See id. at 255 ("[Mluch of the debt discharged in bankruptcy had already been
written off by the issuer as 'uncollectible' because the issuer had determined that the
debtor was so unlikely ever to have the resources to repay that spending another dollar on
debt collection was throwing good money after bad.").
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